This study sought to replicate and extend Hall and colleagues’ (2014) work on developing and validating scales from the Psychopathic Personality Inventory (PPI) to index the triarchic psychopathy constructs of boldness, meanness, and disinhibition. This study also extended Hall et al.’s initial findings by including the PPI Revised (PPI–R). A community sample (n D 240) weighted toward subclinical psychopathy traits and a male prison sample (n D 160) were used for this study. Results indicated that PPI–Boldness, PPI–Meanness, and PPI–Disinhibition converged (...) with other psychopathy, personality, and behavioral criteria in ways conceptually expected from the perspective of the triarchic psychopathy model, including showing very strong convergent and discriminant validity with their Triarchic Psychopathy Measure counterparts. These findings further enhance the utility of the PPI and PPI–R in measuring these constructs. (shrink)

Metaphors for describing the introduction, impacts, and management of non-native species are numerous and often quite outspoken. Policy-makers have adopted increasingly disputed metaphorical terms from scientific discourse. We performed a critical analysis of the use of strong metaphors in reporting scientific findings to policy-makers. Our analysis shows that perceptions of harm, invasiveness or nativeness are dynamic and inevitably display multiple narratives in science, policy or management. Improving our awareness of multiple expert and stakeholder narratives that exist in the context of (...) non-native species management, as well as metaphorical alternatives, is critical. (shrink)

This collection brings together fourteen contributions by authors from around the globe. Each of the contributions engages with questions about how local and global bioethical issues are made to be comparable, in the hope of redressing basic needs and demands for justice. These works demonstrate the significant conceptual contributions that can be made through feminists' attention to debates in a range of interrelated fields, especially as they formulate appropriate responses to developments in medical technology, global economics, population shifts, and poverty.

The definitions and conceptualizations of health, and the management of healthcare have been challenged by the current global scenarios (e.g., new diseases, new geographical distribution of diseases, effects of climate change on health, etc.) and by the ongoing scholarship in humanities and science. In this paper we question the mainstream definition of health adopted by the WHO—‘a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity’ (WHO in Preamble to the constitution of (...) the World Health Organization as adopted by the international health conference, The World Health Organization, 1948)—and its role in providing tools to understand what health is in the contemporary context. More specifically, we argue that this context requires to take into account the role of the environment both in medical theory and in the healthcare practice. To do so, we analyse WHO documents dated 1984 and 1986 which define health as ‘coping with the environment’. We develop the idea of ‘coping with the environment’, by focusing on two cardinal concepts: adaptation in public health and adaptivity in philosophy of biology. We argue that the notions of adaptation and adaptivity can be of major benefit for the characterization of health, and have practical implications. We explore some of these implications by discussing two recent case studies of adaptivity in public health, which can be valuable to further develop adaptive strategies in the current pandemic scenario: community-centred care and microbiologically healthier buildings. (shrink)

Which standards should we employ to evaluate the global order? Should they be standards of justice or standards of legitimacy? In this article, I argue that liberal political theorists need not face this dilemma, because liberal justice and legitimacy are not distinct values. Rather, they indicate what the same value, i.e. equal respect for persons, demands of institutions under different sets of circumstances. I suggest that under real-world circumstances – characterized by conflicts and disagreements – equal respect demands basic-rights protection (...) and democratic participation, which I here call ‘political justice’. I conclude the article by considering three possible configurations of the global order – the ‘democratic world-state’, ‘independent democratic states’, and ‘mixed’ models – and argue that a commitment to political justice speaks in favour of the latter. (shrink)

A prominent view in contemporary political theory, the ‘associative view’, says that duties of justice are triggered by particular cooperative relations between morally significant agents, and that ‘therefore’ principles of justice apply only among fellow citizens. This view has been challenged by advocates of global justice, who point to the existence of a world-wide cooperative network to which principles of justice apply. Call this the challenge from geographical extension. In this paper, I pose a structurally similar challenge to the associative (...) view: the challenge from species extension. This says that the existing network of cooperation extends beyond the human species, to encompass some non-human animals, particularly domesticated dogs. In light of this, if one believes that (i) certain non-human animals are morally significant (i.e. objects of moral concern), and that (ii) justice applies to fellow cooperators, one should also hold that domesticated dogs are owed justice in much the same way our human fellow citizens are. I conclude by considering the implications of this argument for the associative view, and animal-rights theory. (shrink)

Principles of distributive justice bind macro-level institutional agents, like the state. But what does justice require in non-ideal circumstances, where institutional agents are unjust or do not e...

One of the distinctive features of the obligation to obey the law is its content-independence. We ought to do what the law commands because the law commands it, and not because of the law's content—i.e., the independent merits of the actions it prescribes. Despite its popularity, the notion of content-independence is marked by ambiguity. In this paper, I first clarify what content-independence is. I then develop a simple test—the “content-independence test”—which allows us to establish whether any candidate justification of the (...) obligation to obey the law delivers genuine content-independence. I apply this test to prominent such justifications and conclude that several of them, surprisingly, fail it. (shrink)

What is it to share the same concept? The question is an important one since sharing the same concept explains our ability to non-accidentally coordinate on the same topic over time and between individuals. Moreover, concept identity grounds key logical relations among thought contents such as samesaying, contradiction, validity, and entailment. Finally, an account of concept identity is crucial to explaining and justifying epistemic efforts to better understand the precise contents of our thoughts. The key question, then, is what psychological (...) and social facts could play these roles? Elsewhere, we have argued for a specific relational model of concept identity, the connectedness model (e.g. Schroeter 2012, Schroeter and Schroeter 2014, 2015). Our aim in this chapter is to further explain the motivations behind that account, to address worries about transitivity and vagueness, and to contrast our approach with closely related accounts of concept identity developed by François Recanati and Simon Prosser. -/- What’s distinctive of our approach is that we seek to vindicate the first-person epistemic perspective of concept users. Concepts, on our account, play a crucial normative role in setting regulative ideals for the representational practices in which individual subjects participate. This focus on the normative role of concepts – as opposed to a purely causal explanatory role – motivates our approach to concept identity and our toleration of vagueness and borderline cases. (shrink)

El presente trabajo tiene dos objetivos centrales. Primero caracterizaré una variante de pragmatismo conceptual según la cual algunos conceptos deben entenderse como habilidades para identificar sustancias e identificar propiedades del entorno, y mostraré que quien cuenta con esas dos habilidades satisface, en grados diversos en cada caso, distintos requisitos centrales para la posesión de conceptos. Posteriormente defenderé la viabilidad de extender este enfoque a los animales no humanos, apelando a evidencia empírica que indica que distintas especies son capaces de identificar (...) sustancias de su entorno y que sugiere la presencia de habilidades para identificar propiedades en algunos primates y pájaros. (shrink)

Errett Bishop's work in constructive mathematics is overwhelmingly regarded as a turning point for mathematics based on intuitionistic logic. It brought new life to this form of mathematics and prompted the development of new areas of research that witness today's depth and breadth of constructive mathematics. Surprisingly, notwithstanding the extensive mathematical progress since the publication in 1967 of Errett Bishop's Foundations of Constructive Analysis, there has been no corresponding advances in the philosophy of constructive mathematics Bishop style. The aim of (...) this paper is to foster the philosophical debate about this form of mathematics. I begin by considering key elements of philosophical remarks by Bishop, especially focusing on Bishop's assessment of Brouwer. I then compare these remarks with ``traditional'' philosophical arguments for intuitionistic logic and argue that the latter are in tension with Bishop's views. ``Traditional'' arguments for intuitionistic logic turn out to be also in conflict with significant recent developments in constructive mathematics. This rises pressing questions for the philosopher of mathematics, especially with regard to the possibility of offering alternative philosophical arguments for constructive mathematics. I conclude with the suggestion to look anew at Bishop's own remarks for inspiration. (shrink)

The present essay provides an overview of the images of seventeenth-century philosophy in the Rivista di storia della filosofia (then retitled Rivista critica di storia della filosofia) in the years 1946–1983. Founded in 1946 by Mario Dal Pra, the journal promoted a new anti-idealistic approach to the history of philosophy. Based on philological accuracy, this approach enhanced the complexity of history and the interdependence of different fields of knowledge. In particular, the unprecedented emphasis on the connections between science and philosophy (...) entailed a preeminent place for empiricism in the Rivista. This explains why this essay focuses on empiricist currents in seventeenth-century philosophy and especially on three of their representatives, namely Galileo Galilei, Thomas Hobbes and Francis Bacon. (shrink)

Following neo-Aristotelians Alasdair MacIntyre and Martha Nussbaum, we claim that humans are story-telling animals who learn from the stories of diverse others. Moral agents use rational emotions, such as compassion which is our focus here, to imaginatively reconstruct others’ thoughts, feelings and goals. In turn, this imaginative reconstruction plays a crucial role in deliberating and discerning how to act. A body of literature has developed in support of the role narrative artworks (i.e. novels and films) can play in allowing us (...) the opportunity to engage imaginatively and sympathetically with diverse characters and scenarios in a safe protected space that is created by the fictional world. By practising what Nussbaum calls a ‘loving attitude’, her version of ethical attention, we can form virtuous habits that lead to phronesis (practical wisdom). In this paper, and taking compassion as an illustrative focus, we examine the ways that students’ moral education might usefully develop from engaging with narrative artworks through Philosophy for Children (P4C), where philosophy is a praxis, conducted in a classroom setting using a Community of Inquiry (CoI). We argue that narrative artworks provide useful stimulus material to engage students, generate student questions, and motivate philosophical dialogue and the formation of good habits which, in turn, supports the argument for philosophy to be taught in schools. (shrink)

ABSTRACTWhat does it take for lawyers and others to think or talk about the same legal topic—e.g., defamation, culpability? We argue that people are able to think or talk about the same topic not when they possess a matching substantive understanding of the topic, as traditional metasemantics says, but instead when their thoughts or utterances are related to each other in certain ways. And what determines the content of thoughts and utterances is what would best serve the core purposes of (...) the representational practice within which the thought or utterance is located. In thus favoring a “relational model” in metasemantics, we share Ronald Dworkin's goal of explaining fundamental legal disagreements, and also his reliance on constructive interpretation. But what we delineate is a far more general and explanatorily resourceful metasemantics than what Dworkin articulated, which also bypasses some controversial implications for the nature of law that Dworkin alleged. (shrink)

This paper provides an annotated list of printed editions of Aristotle’s Metaphysica Nova, i.e. of the Arabic-Latin 13th-century version of Aristotle’s Metaphysics, which circulated within the Latin translation of Averroes’ Commentarium Magnum (Tafsīr mā baʿd al-ṭabīʿat). It is shown that this version – the impact of which was second to none –was never printed without at least one Greek-into-Latin version. From the 1473 editio princeps to the 1562 Iunctasedition, complementary material from the Greek into Latin and from the Arabic into (...) Latin Aristotelian traditions was increasingly added. Links to relevant digital reproductions are also provided. (shrink)

En México y en otros países, eufemísticamente llama-dos "en desarrollo", los sistemas públicos de atención a la salud enfrentan continuos recortes presupuestales, lo que impacta negativamente a los recursos materiales y a la disminución de plazas para los egresados de las carreras de medicina, esto es, menos contratos de médicos de base en hospitales, clínicas y centros de salud. Bajo este panorama adverso, algunos administradores, desarrolladores de software y no pocos políticos preclaros, suponen que la salida a los problemas económicos (...) estará en el uso intensivo de la inteligencia artificial (en adelante IA) y la robótica. Una vez que los algoritmos sean adecuadamente entrenados, un ejército de robots doctores serán capaces de hacer valoraciones más precisas, diagnósticos 100% acertados, y prescripciones farmacológicas exactas; mucho mejor que los médicos humanos. Además, la IA no se cansa, no protesta, no se sindicaliza… ¿Realidad o ficción? En países como China y el Reino Unido ya se utilizan técnicas computacionales para la interpretación de imágenes de rayos X, detección de tumores, prótesis inteligentes e incluso IA para predecir los resultados de un ataque cerebrovascular isquémico. En México se incorporó a RoomieBot, un robot que sirve para el diagnóstico de pacientes con posible coronavirus. La cirugía robótica Da Vinci es buen ejemplo de cómo la IA puede trabajar colaborativamente con la o el cirujano en el quirófano. Sin embargo, aún quedan por resolver grandes desafíos antes de preocuparse por el llamado desempleo tecnológico de los egresados. Si bien la IA es una valiosa herramienta, en estricto sentido, en esta y en otras muchas áreas su autonomía total es todavía una quimera, por ejemplo: los vehículos autónomos pueden ser engañados y hackeados, y no existe aún un robot que pueda hacer un simple nudo a las correas de sus zapatos sin asistencia 2. Por otra parte, se requiere un marco normativo-todavía inexistente-para la aplicación universal de IA en los cuidados de la salud. Los principios de la bioética están claramente establecidos: la beneficencia, la no maleficencia, la autonomía y la justicia, así como el Juramento Hipocrático. No es así para IA, donde los países interesados no llegan al consenso de los principios morales básicos de la medicina que debería extrapolar 3. Hasta que no se solucionen los problemas técnicos, tecnológicos y, sobre todo, los dilemas éticos, la IA deberá continuar como la útil herramienta que es para la medicina; sin embargo, sustituir el valor intrínseco kantiano de la persona es algo que, seguramente, tendremos mucho tiempo para reflexionar y, acaso, algún día resolver de manera satisfactoria. (shrink)

A growing literature has recognized the importance of mental simulation (e.g., imagining alternatives to reality) in sparking creativity. In this chapter, we examine how counterfactual thinking, or imagining alternatives to past outcomes, affects group creativity. We explore these effects by articulating a model that considers the influence of counterfactual thinking on both the cognitive and social processes known to impact group creative performance. With this framework, we aim to stimulate research on group creativity from a counterfactual perspective.

En este texto abordo la concepción de la filosofía de Laura Benítez y su propuesta de vías reflexivas. A partir de lo anterior, ofrezco una reflexión metodológica sobre la historia de la filosofía como filosofía.

This paper presents an attempt to solve Laura Valentini’s ideal theory paradox, in a way which makes me think of G.E. Moore but I shall leave the classification of the solution to the experts. I also discuss the claim that philosophy is so easy.

Louise Antony calls Laura Ekstrom’s book “courageous” (backcover). I have no clue what it means for a work of philosophy to be courageous, but Ekstrom’s book is certainly good. And despite the fact that I think there are about a million problems with it, I recommend it to anyone interested in the problem of evil or skeptical theism: it's well researched and clearly argued—undergraduates as well as professional philosophers will find this book useful. (Well, this recommendation comes with one (...) caveat: the book—through no fault of the author—is priced at $99, which is worth roughly 90 McChickens. I cannot in good conscience recommend any philosophy book over 90 McChickens.) In what follows, I will summarize and comment on Ekstrom’s book. I will have more to say about chapters I personally found interesting (i.e. chapters 1, 2, and 4) and less to say about chapters that I found less interesting (i.e. chapters 3, and 5-8). (shrink)

The potential to collect brain data more directly, with higher resolution, and in greater amounts has heightened worries about mental and brain privacy. In order to manage the risks to individuals posed by these privacy challenges, some have suggested codifying new privacy rights, including a right to “mental privacy.” In this paper, we consider these arguments and conclude that while neurotechnologies do raise significant privacy concerns, such concerns are—at least for now—no different from those raised by other well-understood data collection (...) technologies, such as gene sequencing tools and online surveillance. To better understand the privacy stakes of brain data, we suggest the use of a conceptual framework from information ethics, Helen Nissenbaum’s “contextual integrity” theory. To illustrate the importance of context, we examine neurotechnologies and the information flows they produce in three familiar contexts—healthcare and medical research, criminal justice, and consumer marketing. We argue that by emphasizing what is distinct about brain privacy issues, rather than what they share with other data privacy concerns, risks weakening broader efforts to enact more robust privacy law and policy. (shrink)

The orthodox view of anger takes desires for revenge or retribution to be central to the emotion. In this paper, I develop an empirically informed challenge to the retributive view of anger. In so doing, I argue that a distinct desire is central to anger: a desire for recognition. Desires for recognition aim at the targets of anger acknowledging the wrong they have committed, as opposed to aiming for their suffering. In light of the centrality of this desire for recognition, (...) I argue that the retributive view of anger should be abandoned. I consider and dismiss two types of moves that can be made on the part of a proponent of the orthodox view in response to my argument. I propose that a pluralist view, which allows for both retribution and recognition in anger, is to be preferred. (shrink)

Outlaw emotions are emotions that stand in tension with one’s wider belief system, often allowing epistemic insight one may have otherwise lacked. Outlaw emotions are thought to play crucial epistemic roles under conditions of oppression. Although the crucial epistemic value of these emotions is widely acknowledged, specific accounts of their epistemic role(s) remain largely programmatic. There are two dominant accounts of the epistemic role of emotions: The Motivational View and the Justificatory View. Philosophers of emotion assume that these dominant ways (...) of accounting for the epistemic role(s) of emotions in general are equipped to account for the epistemic role(s) of outlaw emotions. I argue that this is not the case. I consider and dismiss two responses that could be made on behalf of the most promising account, the Justificatory View, in light of my argument, before sketching an alternative account that should be favoured. (shrink)

Anger is often an appropriate reaction to harms and injustices, but is it a politically beneficial one? Martha Nussbaum (Journal of the American Philosophical Association 1 (1), 41–56, 2015, Anger and Forgiveness. Oxford University Press, 2016) has argued that, although anger is useful in initially recruiting agents for action, anger is typically counterproductive to securing the political aims of those harmed. After the initial shockwave of outrage, Nussbaum argues that to be effective at enacting positive social change, groups and individuals (...) alike, must move quickly out of the state of anger. Feminist theorists (Frye, The Politics of Reality. Crossing Press, 1983; Lorde, 1997; Narayan, Hypatia 3 (2): 31–48, 1988) on the other hand have for long highlighted the efficacy of anger, as well as its moral and epistemic value, in fighting against the oppressive status quo. It might be thought therefore that for political action to be effective, a continued state of anger is preferable. Protestors must after all create and sustain a sense of moral obligation and justice. A main way of doing so is to promote successive moral shocks that trigger outrage (Jasper, Emotion Review 6 (3): 208–213, 2014). I present a novel, empirically informed defense of anger’s efficacy in political action. Nussbaum holds a traditional view on the nature of anger, inherited from Aristotle and the Stoics, which holds that anger constitutively involves a desire for retribution. The view that anger is counterproductive falls out of this and is dominant in academic work as well as in our personal and political lives. Based on work in social psychology, I argue that we need to reconsider this. In doing so, I highlight anger’s aim for recognition, rather than retribution, as key. Furthermore, I uncover conditions for anger’s political efficacy, as well as reasons for why the traditional view of anger has been so pervasive. (shrink)

In this article I argue that characterizations of anger as a hostile emotion may be mistaken. My project is empirically informed and is partly descriptive, partly diagnostic. It is descriptive in that I am concerned with what anger is, and how it tends to manifest, rather than with what anger should be or how moral anger is manifested. The orthodox view on anger takes it to be, descriptively, an emotion that aims for retribution. This view fits well with anger being (...) a hostile emotion, as retribution is punitive. I will argue that a different view of anger deserves our attention. On this alternative view, anger aims for recognition of harms done, rather than for the punishment of those who have committed them. I argue that we have reason to favour a strong view that excludes retribution from anger’s main aims. In addition, I offer a diagnosis of the reasons that led the retributive view of anger to become, and remain, orthodoxy. This diagnosis provides indirect reason to give my descriptive proposal serious consideration, for it highlights that the orthodox view has dominated folk and philosophical conceptions of anger for reasons that do not speak in favour of the view’s veracity. The view that anger is a hostile emotion will therefore emerge as in need of serious scrutiny. (shrink)

In this paper I lay the foundations for the construction of an affective quality space. I begin by outlining what quality spaces are, and how they have been constructed for sensory qualities across different perceptual modalities. I then turn to tackle four obstacles that an affective quality space might face that would make an affective quality space unfeasible. After showing these obstacles to be surmountable, I propose a number of conditions and methodological constraints that should be satisfied in attempts to (...) construct an affective quality space. Before concluding, I detail the high explanatory pay-off such a project promises. (shrink)

RELAÇÃO E EFEITOS BIOQUÍMICO-NUTRICIONAIS SOBRE O CATARRO GENITAL II E III EM VACAS -/- Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro da Silva Departamento de Agropecuária – IFPE Campus Belo Jardim [email protected] ou [email protected] WhatsApp: (82)98143-8399 -/- 4. CATARRO GENITAL II E III -/- O catarro genital ou metrite (inflamação do miométrio) é uma inflamação inespecífica no trato genital. Existem duas barreiras que impedem a chegada de germes ao interior do trato genital. As barreiras de tipo hemático (diferença de fluxo sanguíneo) e imunossupressão parcial (...) originada pela progesterona, superadas as barreiras, podem se apresentar inflamação no momento do parto ou após o mesmo e frequentemente é acompanhada de retenção de placenta. A principal causa é a deficiência de fatores nutricionais, que causam distúrbios no metabolismo normal do animal. Os catarros trazem problemas de infertilidade, anestro, aumento entre o intervalo entre partos (IEP), o que acarretam altas perdas econômicas na produção (FRAZER, 2005; GORDON, 1996). Podem se manifestar em diferentes graus, que caracterizam-se por fatores específicos; serão abordados os catarros de 2° e 3° grau. 4.1 Relação Sódio (Na) e Potássio (K) Um dos fatores nutricionais associados ao catarro genital é a deficiência de sódio ou o excesso de potássio, o problema existente entre o excesso ou deficiência de um mineral reside na presença imediata de um desequilíbrio homeostático entre a relação fisiológica dos mesmos e portanto um desequilíbrio no metabolismo (funcionamento normal do organismo). A relação potássio:sódio (K:Na) ideal situa-se entre 10-15:1 (DEHNING, 1987) e demonstrou-se que à medida que se amplia essa relação se agrava a eficiência reprodutiva. Ao haver um excesso de sódio no organismo altera-se o equilíbrio de potássio:sódio (K:Na), aumentando os níveis de sódio os níveis de potássio diminuem, causando principalmente problemas na síntese de hormonas sexuais, que por sua vez apresentam um efeito negativo no ciclo estral normal da fêmea, além de problemas no parto (partos distócicos), isto porque no córtex adrenal deve produzir-se aldosterona para regular a homeostase mineral, devido ao fato do substrato bioquímico para a síntese da aldosterona ser o mesmo que para a síntese das hormonas sexuais, nomeadamente estrogênios, portanto, estes não se produzem provocando menor contratilidade uterina, o que favorece a contaminação e colonização bacterial típica dos quadros de metrite. Em média, uma vaca de 600 kg com uma produção de leite de 15 kg/dia, requer uma dieta com 230 g/dia de potássio. As concentrações sugeridas pela NRC para bovinos de corte com dieta de matéria seca (MS) é de 0,6 – 0,7% e a concentração máxima de 3%. Para garantir esses níveis de exigências, as forragens apresentam entre 1 % e 4% de K, portanto são excelentes fontes desse mineral. Em geral, os grãos de cereais são deficientes, menos 0,5% de K, no entanto farelos de oleaginosas são uma boa fonte de suplementação. O excesso de fornecimento de sódio (Na) é relativamente raro, mas clinicamente resulta em achados semelhantes de acetonemia, além de enfraquecimento, retenção de placenta, inflamação do aparelho genital e distúrbios no funcionamento ovariano. As forrageiras possuem um teor deficiente em sódio, uma vez que tal elemento é considerado prejudicial às plantas. Uma das formas de garantir a exigência de sódio no animal, é a disponibilidade à vontade de sal mineral (NaCl) em cochos espalhados pela propriedade. De forma geral, o consumo de sódio por animal/ dia deve ser de 20 a 25 g, o que perfaz aproximadamente 50 g de NaCl/cab./dia, considerando-se um percentual de 39% de sódio nesse composto. Vale salientar que o sódio têm função reguladora, portanto, sua disponibilidade não deve ser maior que a exigência requerida pelo animal. 4.2 Relação do Fósforo (P) Outro fator associado com metrite é, o excesso de fósforo (P) na dieta, pode ser dado por uma excessiva ou inadequada suplementação mineral, por intensa fertilização nas pastagens, por utilização de pastos sumamente jovens ou pelo consumo de grandes quantidades de grãos (soja) e cereais. Simultaneamente, com o excesso de fósforo é frequentemente encontrada uma diminuição do teor de manganês no tecido uterino, como consequência a diminuição da resposta do útero aos estrogênios (DEHNING, 1987). Estes, por sua vez, são responsáveis pelo movimento uterino e por criar maior resistência às infecções do trato genital. O intervalo sugerido pelas instituições de pesquisa está entre 0,12 – 0,20% na dieta de MS. Porém esse intervalo depende de alguns fatores como a idade dos animais e a categoria em que se encontram. O fósforo é um elemento que encontra-se em constantes debates em empresas e instituições agropecuárias. Pesquisadores da Austrália revelaram que 0,12% de sódio na matéria seca estaria o mais próximo possível dos níveis exigidos pelos bovinos de corte, o que contradiz os 30% requeridos pela NRC. Contudo, experimentos realizados pela Embrapa, concluíram que uma dieta em matéria seca de forrageiras com 100%, 70% e 40% dos níveis exigidos de fósforo, tiveram ganho de peso semelhantes. Por exemplo, os animais que receberam 70% dos requisitos tiveram ganho de peso médio entre 0,500 e 0,600 g/dia, muito semelhante ao mesmo ganho quando se forneceram 100% dos requisitos do fósforo. Nas forrageiras a disponibilidade de fósforo depende da disponibilidade do mesmo no solo. Nos grãos de cereais e farelos de oleaginosas contêm de moderado a alto teor de P, e nos produtos de origem animal, como farinha de peixe, o teor de P é considerado alto. 4.3 Relação Cálcio (Ca) e Fósforo (P) O caso de fornecimento exagerado de fósforo causa um efeito inverso da relação cálcio:fósforo (Ca:P), ou seja, sendo o fósforo dominante, maior será o déficit absoluto ou relativo de cálcio, cujas manifestações clínicas no aspecto reprodutivo correspondem amplamente com aquelas do excesso de fósforo. Um excesso absoluto de fósforo na presença de um abastecimento suficiente de cálcio é menos prejudicial para a reprodução do que um fornecimento de fósforo de acordo com os requisitos na presença de níveis deficitários de cálcio (DEHNING, 1987). Isto porque o cálcio, regula a contratilidade do músculo liso, como no miométrio. O intervalo sugerido de cálcio na dieta em MS está entre 0,19 e 0,33%, dependendo de fatores como a idade dos animais e o ganho de peso diário. Por exemplo, uma vaca de 600 kg que produz 15 kg/leite/dia requer uma dieta que contenha 40 g/dia de cálcio. O teor tóxico de cálcio na MS de forrageiras, leguminosas e gramíneas é de 4,4%. Para suprir a exigência em cálcio do animal, para que previna os catarros genitais em seus diferentes graus, bem como demais doenças a dieta está alicerçadamente entre o fornecimento de ração concentrada com misturas como farinha de ossos e fosfato bicálcico com elevados teores de Ca, ou entre os volumosos como as gramíneas, leguminosas ou forrageiras. Vale destacar que as leguminosas possuem baixo teor de Ca em sua composição, entretanto é maior do que a presença em gramíneas. A alfafa é uma forrageira que possui bastante cálcio em sua composição e que pode ser todo disponível para o animal. Por fim, os grãos de cereais como milho, soja, sorgo, etc., possui baixo teor de cálcio. O déficit de cálcio em vacas leiteiras de alta produção traz consequências como a doença da vaca caída (hipocalcemia) devido a sua alta exigência do mineral, especialmente após o parto, isto, por sua vez, causa uma inércia uterina que dificulta a eliminação de bactérias adquiridas durante o parto, propiciando um ambiente adequado para a multiplicação e contaminação do trato genital. 4.4 Relação energia: proteína e Vitamina A O excesso de proteína ocorre frequentemente quando a alimentação é baseada em pastoreio, especialmente quando os animais recebem uma carga intensa de fertilizantes (com estrume ou nitrogênio) e, simultaneamente, é oferecido um suplemento concentrado rico em proteína (DEHNING, 1987). O excesso de proteína depende da quantidade de alimento consumido, sendo os animais de maior produção os mais afetados, uma vez que passam maior tempo para chegar ao peso ideal de abate (animais de corte), ou quando sua produção é potencialmente leiteira. As grandes quantidades de amônio produzido pelo processo de degradação da proteína nos ruminantes resultam numa sobrecarga prolongada no fígado, aumento dos níveis da enzima GOT (alterações hepáticas; que por sua vez resultam na apresentação de catarros genitais de grau II e III) e altos níveis da enzima GLDH. Estes distúrbios são agravados quando, ao mesmo tempo, há uma deficiência de energia. O excesso de proteína crua faz com que nas secreções uterinas se produzam mudanças no conteúdo dos minerais e um desequilíbrio entre os mesmos causando problemas reprodutivos de índole infecciosa e diminui adicionalmente a capacidade de sobrevivência dos espermatozoides e óvulos. A deficiência de vitamina A, também pode causar catarro genital. Recordando que as vitaminas são um grupo de compostos orgânicos essenciais no metabolismo necessário para o crescimento e o bom funcionamento do organismo. Entre estas, a vitamina A é considerada uma vitamina lipossolúvel que deriva dos carotenos presentes nos vegetais. Esta afeta a formação e manutenção da pele, membranas mucosas, ossos e dentes, retina e possui íntima relação com a reprodução. No último caso há falta de secreção da membrana mucosa do trato genital, o que produz susceptibilidade à invasão bacteriana (catarro genital II e III). O corpo obtém a vitamina A, fabricando-a a partir dos carotenos, precursores da vitamina A, que se encontram nos vegetais (forrageiras, leguminosas e gramíneas). O fornecimento de betacarotenos depende do conteúdo dos mesmos na ração. E se houver deficiência destes não pode haver formação de vitamina A, assim a porcentagem de falhas no crescimento do tecido endometrial leva a catarros genitais, mortalidade embrionária e abortos precoces. Logo, mediante os trabalhos anteriores, o fornecimento dessa vitamina, quantos dos demais macronutrientes exigidos pelo animal por meio da alimentação volumosa ou concentrada é essencial para obtenção do sucesso contra esse transtorno reprodutivo do catarro genital, quanto de demais outros seja no combate ou prevenção. -/- REFERÊNCIAS BIBLIOGRÁFICAS -/- BARBOSA, Fabiano Alvim; SOUZA, G. M. Efeito dos microminerais na reprodução de bovinos. Belo Horizonte: Portal Agronomia, 2009. BERCHIELLI, Telma Teresinha; PIRES, Alexandre Vaz; OLIVEIRA, SG de. Nutrição de ruminantes. Jaboticabal: funep, 2006. BOLAND, M. P. Efectos nutricionales en la reproducción del ganado. XXXI Jornadas Uruguayas de Buiatría, 2003. DEHNING, R. Interrelaciones entre nutrición y fertilidad. In: Curso Manejo de la Fertilidad Bovina18-23 May 1987Medellín (Colombia). CICADEP, Bogotá (Colombia) Universidad de La Salle, Medellín (Colombia) Instituto Colombiano Agropecurio, Bogotá (Colombia) Sociedad Alemana de Cooperación Técnica-GTZ (Alemania), 1987. DE LUCA, Leonardo J. Nutrición y fertilidad en el ganado lechero. XXXVI Jornadas Uruguayas de Buiatría, 2008. FRAZER, Grant S. Bovine theriogenology. Veterinary Clinics: Food Animal Practice, v. 21, n. 2, p. xiii-xiv, 2005. GORDON, Ian. Controlled reproduction in farm animals series. Nova Iorque: CAB International, 1996. HENRIQUES, Laura Cristina Sant'Anna. Perfil metabólico de vacas da raça Holandesa com catarro genital de graus I, II e III entre o final do puerpério clínico e no puerpério tardio, São Paulo e Paraná, Brasil. 2011. Tese de Doutorado. FMVZUniversidade de São Paulo. MORAES, S. da S. Importância da suplementação mineral para bovinos de corte. Campo Grande, MS: Embrapa Gado de Corte, 2001., 2001. -/- Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro da Silva Belo Jardim, 29 de março de 2020. (shrink)

It's widely accepted that social facts about an individual's linguistic community can affect both the reference of her words and the concepts those words express. Theorists sympathetic to the internalist tradition have sought to accommodate these social dependence phenomena without altering their core theoretical commitments by positing deferential reference-fixing criteria. In this paper, we sketch a different explanation of social dependence phenomena, according to which all concepts are individuated in part by causal-historical relations linking token elements of thought.

A characteristic form of philosophical inquiry seeks to answer ‘what is x?’ questions. In this paper, we ask how philosophers do and should adjudicate debates about the correct answer to such questions. We argue that philosophers do and should rely on a distinctive type of pragmatic and meta-representational reasoning – a form of rationalizing self-interpretation – in answering ‘what is x?’ questions. We start by placing our methodological discussion within a broader theoretical framework. We posit a necessary connection between epistemic (...) methodology and metasemantics. In our view, the correct semantic assignment for a representation must be justifiable from the epistemic perspective of the subject herself, given suitable empirical information and cognitive powers. So the upshot of your own ideal, fully informed epistemic methods will determine the correct answers to ‘what is x?’ questions. The bulk of the paper is devoted to articulating and defending our rationalizing self-interpretation account of philosophical methodology. By working through a specific example, we seek to isolate the relevant inputs into deliberation and the methods for adjudicating between competing answers to a ‘what is x?’ question. We suggest that the self-interpretive methods we isolate generalize across the board as a way of identifying the real nature of familiar topics. We also explain how these methods undercut the case for a priori conceptual analysis. (shrink)

The phenomenon of self-anger has been overlooked in the contemporary literature on emotion. This is a failing we should seek to remedy. In this paper I provide the first ef-fort towards a philosophical characterization of self-anger. I argue that self-anger is a genuine instance of anger and that, as such, it is importantly distinct from the negative self-directed emotions of guilt and shame. Doing so will uncover a potentially distinctive role for self-anger in our moral psychology, as one of the (...) strongest affective motiva-tors for self-change. (shrink)

In this article I present a disagreement between classical and constructive approaches to predicativity regarding the predicative status of so-called generalised inductive definitions. I begin by offering some motivation for an enquiry in the predicative foundations of constructive mathematics, by looking at contemporary work at the intersection between mathematics and computer science. I then review the background notions and spell out the above-mentioned disagreement between classical and constructive approaches to predicativity. Finally, I look at possible ways of defending the constructive (...) predicativity of inductive definitions. (shrink)

Although the view that sees proper names as referential singular terms is widely considered orthodoxy, there is a growing popularity to the view that proper names are predicates. This is partly because the orthodoxy faces two anomalies that Predicativism can solve: on the one hand, proper names can have multiple bearers. But multiple bearerhood is a problem to the idea that proper names have just one individual as referent. On the other hand, as Burge noted, proper names can have predicative (...) uses. But the view that proper names are singular terms arguably does not have the resources to deal with Burge’s cases. In this paper I argue that the Predicate View of proper names is mistaken. I first argue against the syntactic evidence used to support the view and against the predicativist’s methodology of inferring a semantic account for proper names based on incomplete syntactic data. I also show that Predicativism can neither explain the behaviour of proper names in full generality, nor claim the fundamentality of predicative names. In developing my own view, however, I accept the insight that proper names in some sense express generality. Hence I propose that proper names—albeit fundamentally singular referential terms—express generality in two senses. First, by being used as predicates, since then they are true of many individuals; and second, by being referentially related to many individuals. I respond to the problem of multiple bearerhood by proposing that proper names are polyreferential, and also explain the behaviour of proper names in light of the wider phenomenon I called category change, and show how Polyreferentialism can account for all uses of proper names. (shrink)

Trust is a core feature of the physician-patient relationship, and risk is central to trust. Patients take risks when they trust their providers to care for them effectively and appropriately. Not all patients take these risks: some medical relationships are marked by mistrust and suspicion. Empirical evidence suggests that some patients and families of color in the United States may be more likely to mistrust their providers and to be suspicious of specific medical practices and institutions. Given both historical and (...) ongoing oppression and injustice in American medical institutions, such mistrust can be apt. Yet it can also frustrate patient care, leading to family and provider distress. In this paper, I propose one way that providers might work to reestablish trust by taking risks in signaling their own trustworthiness. This interpersonal step is not meant to replace efforts to remedy systemic injustice, but is an immediate measure for addressing mistrust in occurrent cases. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Theories of sets such as Zermelo Fraenkel set theory are usually presented as the combination of two distinct kinds of principles: logical and set-theoretic principles. The set-theoretic principles are imposed ‘on top’ of first-order logic. This is in agreement with a traditional view of logic as universally applicable and topic neutral. Such a view of logic has been rejected by the intuitionists, on the ground that quantification over infinite domains requires the use of intuitionistic rather than classical logic. In (...) the following, I consider constructive set theories, which use intuitionistic rather than classical logic, and argue that they manifest a distinctive interdependence or an entanglement between sets and logic. In fact, Martin-Löf type theory identifies fundamental logical and set-theoretic notions. Remarkably, one of the motivations for this identification is the thought that classical quantification over infinite domains is problematic, while intuitionistic quantification is not. The approach to quantification adopted in Martin-Löf’s type theory is subtly interconnected with its predicativity. I conclude by recalling key aspects of an approach to predicativity inspired by Poincaré, which focuses on the issue of correct quantification over infinite domains and relate it back to Martin-Löf type theory. (shrink)

Is democracy a requirement of justice or an instrument for realizing it? The correct answer to this question, I argue, depends on the background circumstances against which democracy is defended. In the presence of thin reasonable disagreement about justice, we should value democracy only instrumentally (if at all); in the presence of thick reasonable disagreement about justice, we should value it also intrinsically, as a necessary demand of justice. Since the latter type of disagreement is pervasive in real-world politics, I (...) conclude that theories of justice designed for our world should be centrally concerned with democracy. (shrink)

Various philosophers authors have argued—on the basis of powerful examples—that we can have compelling moral or practical reasons to believe, even when the evidence suggests otherwise. This paper explores an alternative story, which still aims to respect widely shared intuitions about the motivating examples. Specifically, the paper proposes that what is at stake in these cases is not belief, but rather acceptance—an attitude classically characterized as taking a proposition as a premise in practical deliberation and action. I suggest that acceptance’s (...) theoretical usefulness in the ethics of belief has been hidden by its psychological obscurity. I thus aim to develop an empirically adequate and mechanistically specific psychological profile of acceptance. I characterize acceptance as centrally involving a cognitive gating function, in which we prevent a target belief state from having its characteristic downstream effects on reasoning, cognition, and action, and restructure those downstream processes. I then argue that there is substantial empirical support for the existence of the cognitive mechanisms needed to instantiate this view, coming from the science of emotion regulation. I argue that acceptance involves deploying the same mechanisms used in emotional response modulation to belief states: acceptance is doxastic response modulation. I then propose that having a better understanding of the psychological profile of acceptance leaves us better positioned to appreciate its potential usefulness for making progress on various puzzles within the ethics of belief. (shrink)

When and why do socially constructed norms—including the laws of the land, norms of etiquette, and informal customs—generate moral obligations? I argue that the answer lies in the duty to respect others, specifically to give them what I call “agency respect.” This is the kind of respect that people are owed in light of how they exercise their agency. My central thesis is this: To the extent that (i) existing norms are underpinned by people’s commitments as agents and (ii) they (...) do not conflict with morality, they place moral demands on us on agency-respect grounds. This view of the moral force of socially constructed norms, I suggest, is superior to views that deny the moral force of such norms, and it elegantly explains certain instances of wrongdoing that would otherwise remain unaccounted for. (shrink)

In his recent bookThe Idea of Justice, Amartya Sen suggests that political philosophy should move beyond the dominant, Rawls-inspired, methodological paradigm – what Sen calls ‘transcendental institutionalism’ – towards a more practically oriented approach to justice: ‘realization-focused comparison’. In this article, I argue that Sen's call for a paradigm shift in thinking about justice is unwarranted. I show that his criticisms of the Rawlsian approach are either based on misunderstandings, or correct but of little consequence, and conclude that the Rawlsian (...) approach already delivers much of what Sen himself wants from a theory of justice. (shrink)

There are many different interpretations of what the family should be – its desired member composition, its primary purpose, and its cultural significance – and many different examples of what families actually look like across the globe. I examine the most paradigmatic conceptions of the family that are based upon the supposed primary purpose that the family serves for its members and for the state. I then suggest that we ought to reconceptualize how we understand and define the family in (...) an effort to move away from these paradigmatic conceptions. This approach requires that we examine the way(s) in which the family has been defined descriptively – that is, how families have been defined historically – in an effort to determine what a normative theory of the family might look like. The goal of this inquiry is to define a family in terms of what it ought to be – a goal that moves our understanding of the family to a new conceptual landscape. I then present my own account of familial relations that aims to capture a normative understanding of the unique primary purpose that the family serves for its members. (shrink)

A globalized world, some argue, needs a global democracy. But there is considerable disagreement about whether global democracy is an ideal worth pursuing. One of the main grounds for scepticism is captured by the slogan: “No global demos, no global democracy.” The fact that a key precondition of democracy—a demos—is absent at the global level, some argue, speaks against the pursuit of global democracy. The paper discusses four interpretations of the skeptical slogan—each based on a specific account of the notion (...) of “the demos”—and concludes that none of them establishes that the global democratic ideal must be abandoned. In so doing, the paper (i) systematizes different types of objections against global democracy, thus bringing some clarity to an otherwise intricate debate and (ii) offers a robust but qualified defense of the global democratic ideal. (shrink)

This article provides a conceptual map of the debate on ideal and non‐ideal theory. It argues that this debate encompasses a number of different questions, which have not been kept sufficiently separate in the literature. In particular, the article distinguishes between the following three interpretations of the ‘ideal vs. non‐ideal theory’ contrast: (i) full compliance vs. partial compliance theory; (ii) utopian vs. realistic theory; (iii) end‐state vs. transitional theory. The article advances critical reflections on each of these sub‐debates, and highlights (...) areas for future research in the field. (shrink)

In this article, I develop a new account of the liberal view that principles of justice are meant to justify state coercion, and consider its implications for the question of global socioeconomic justice. Although contemporary proponents of this view deny that principles of socioeconomic justice apply globally, on my newly developed account this conclusion is mistaken. I distinguish between two types of coercion, systemic and interactional, and argue that a plausible theory of global justice should contain principles justifying both. The (...) justification of interactional coercion requires principles regulating interstate interference; that of systemic coercion requires principles of global socioeconomic justice. I argue that the proposed view not only helps us make progress in the debate on global justice, but also offers an independently compelling and systematic account of the function and conditions of applicability of justice. -/-. (shrink)

Feminist philosophers are right to criticize Hegel’s prejudices against women. In many of his works, Hegel reduces women to their physiology as means of explaining why they occupy a subordinate role in nature and in society. Such treatment seems arbitrary at best, for the gendering of roles disrupts Hegel’s dialectical approach to spirit without any meaningful gain. Despite this defect in Hegel’s work, what is positive in Hegelian social and political philosophy remains intact. In this paper I argue that the (...) sexist claims that Hegel makes about women are irrelevant to his theory of the family in the Philosophy of Right. Therein, Hegel outlines three components that are necessary for the completion of the family: marriage, property and assets, and the raising of children. Hegel also includes a description of the different roles occupied by family members and divides these roles along gender lines. Given the three components that are essential to the family, I argue that there is no necessary basis for familial roles to be divided by gender. (shrink)

In this article, I analyze norm enforcement on social media, specifically cases where an agent has committed a moral transgression online and is brought to account by an Internet mob with incongruously injurious results in their offline life. I argue that users problematically imagine that they are members of a particular kind of moral community where shaming behaviors are not only acceptable, but morally required to ‘take down’ those who appear to violate community norms. I then demonstrate the costs that (...) are associated with this strategy; the most worrisome being those that distort the nature of moral dialog and the purpose and effectiveness of accountability practices online, creating a vitriolic and polarising online environment. Because of these negative consequences, I suggest that we ought to hold others accountable for restorative ends. I argue that restorative accountability practices can help us cultivate new norms online that rely less for their enforcement upon negative acts such as shame, and more upon positive acts that focus upon the most appropriate way to make amends to the victim(s) and the community. In this sense, restorative accountability incorporates important elements from the ethics of care, a relational ethics that values creating, promoting, and restoring good social and personal relationships. I conclude by arguing that accountability practices premised on the ethics of care produce better outcomes for the victim (s) of a moral violation, the transgressor, and the community. (shrink)

Predicativity is a notable example of fruitful interaction between philosophy and mathematical logic. It originated at the beginning of the 20th century from methodological and philosophical reflections on a changing concept of set. A clarification of this notion has prompted the development of fundamental new technical instruments, from Russell's type theory to an important chapter in proof theory, which saw the decisive involvement of Kreisel, Feferman and Schütte. The technical outcomes of predica-tivity have since taken a life of their own, (...) but have also produced a deeper understanding of the notion of predicativity, therefore witnessing the " light logic throws on problems in the foundations of mathematics. " (Feferman 1998, p. vii) Predicativity has been at the center of a considerable part of Feferman's work: over the years he has explored alternative ways of explicating and analyzing this notion and has shown that predicative mathematics extends much further than expected within ordinary mathematics. The aim of this note is to outline the principal features of predicativity, from its original motivations at the start of the past century to its logical analysis in the 1950-60's. The hope is to convey why predicativity is a fascinating subject, which has attracted Feferman's attention over the years. (shrink)